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Abstract 
When creating software, the stability, quality, and security of the software is an 
important part of the development. To ensure good quality, some form of software 
testing must be used.  
 
This thesis evaluates the use of fuzzing as a software testing method. The basic idea of 
fuzzing is to, in a semi-random way, manipulate input data to a program in an attempt to 
make the program crash or misbehave, and thereby find faults in the software. The 
theory of fuzzing and different types of fuzzing will be described. The focus is set on 
fuzzing to improve the quality of the software, rather than the security aspect.  
 
Methods used to evaluate fuzzing as a test method include; finding what kind of fuzzing 
tools that are available today, and implementation of one fuzzing method. For the 
implementation, the fuzzing tool American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) was chosen to do tests on an 
embedded systems application. 
 
The results are that fuzzing can be used as a test method for an embedded system. But 
the benefits of fuzzing can vary, depending on the system tested. In the tests that were 
made only low hanging fruit, shallow faults, could be found. 
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Abstrakt 
Kvalité, stabilitet och säkerhet är viktiga faktorer som måste beaktas när en mjukvara 
utvecklas. För att säkerställa att alla faktorer uppfylls, så måste mjukvaran genomgå 
någon form av testning.  
 
I denna avhandling undersöktes mjukvarutestning med metoden fuzzing. Grundidén 
med fuzzing är att, på ett delvis slumpartat sätt, manipulera data som skickas till ett 
program för att se hur programmet reagerar. Om programmet då kraschar, eller på 
annat sätt utförs felaktigt, så har ett problem hittats i mjukvaran. I avhandlingen 
beskrevs teorin bakom fuzzing, såväl som olika typer av fuzzing. Fokus låg på fuzzing i 
syfte att öka kvalité och stabilitet, och mindre på säkerhetsfaktorn.  
 
Metoder som använts för att evaluera fuzzing som testmetod inkluderar; undersökning 
av vilka fuzzing verktyg som finns tillgängliga idag, och implementering av en fuzzing-
metod. Till implementeringen valdes fuzzing verktyget American Fuzzy Lop (AFL), för att 
utföra tester på en applikation för ett inbyggt system.  
 
Resultatet var att fuzzing är en metod som kan användas för ett inbyggt system, men 
beroende på systemet så kan fördelarna med fuzzing variera. I de utförda testerna så 
kunde endaste ytliga problem påträffas.  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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1 Introduction 
It is nearly impossible to write a big complex program without making some small mistakes, 
introducing bugs and possible vulnerabilities into the code. Finding bugs, causes of program 
crashes, or vulnerabilities is a big challenge. There are many different approaches to tackle 
these, and for a good result, more than one approach must be used. A relatively unknown 
method to approach these problems is called fuzzing. Fuzzing is quite a different approach 
compared to the commonly used methods. Fuzzing is about testing the limits of inputs made 
to the system under test (referred to as SUT), by automatically feeding the program with 
semi-random or mutated data.  
This thesis is going to explore what fuzzing is, how it can be used, what software is available 
and evaluate how fuzzing could be applied to embedded systems at Wärtsilä. 
1.1 Wärtsilä 
This thesis is written for Wärtsilä Finland, department of Engine Performance and Control. 
Wärtsilä is a Finnish company, established in 1834. Today Wärtsilä is a technology company 
delivering the world’s most efficient engine, complete systems for ships, power plants, and 
maintenance for all their systems. One in three ships around the world run with Wärtsilä 
technology. In 2016, Wärtsilä employed 18,000 people with operations in more than 200 
locations in 70 countries. Wärtsilä is listed on Nasdaq Helsinki and in 2016 had net sales of 
4.8 billion euro. Wärtsilä is divided into three main divisions, Marine Solutions (35%), 
Energy Solutions (20%), and Services (46%), (% of net sales by area – 2016).  [1] 
1.2 Background 
An essential part of software development is to test and verify that the written software works 
as expected, even under unusual conditions. Testing involves finding bugs, unexpected 
behaviors, and vulnerabilities. For this, there needs to be more thorough testing than only 
testing that the functionalities meet the specifications.  
There is no single answer to what the best method for discovering bugs and vulnerabilities 
in software is. There are a bunch of different approaches to software testing, all with their 
individual strengths; there is no one method that for sure will find all the bugs and 
vulnerabilities in a given software. Different approaches will uncover different types of 
problems. To get the best possible coverage, a mix of different methods are necessary [2]. 
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1.3 Purpose and delimitations 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the use of fuzzing as a test method on an embedded 
system to increase the software quality. 
The scope will be delimited to fuzzing of an embedded system with a focus on the 
programming languages c and c++, compiled by gcc and g++. A few fuzzers will be chosen 
and evaluated at a high level, one of them is then used for implementation testing. There will 
be no extensive testing or comparison of performance between fuzzers. 
1.4 Method 
Different fuzzing methods will be described and evaluated for use on an embedded system. 
Google will be used to find available fuzzing tools, fuzzers. A few useful fuzzers will be 
considered, and one will be chosen for further testing. Tests will be made on a small program 
to get an idea of how fuzzing can be implemented, and find out which type of problems that 
may occur. 
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2 Theory 
This chapter explains what software testing is, before going deeper into fuzzing in the next 
section. Discussed here are; bugs and vulnerabilities, the concept of code coverage, and the 
differences between black-, white-, and grey-box software testing. 
2.1 Bugs and vulnerabilities 
A bug is when a system is not behaving the way it is intended to. Can also be recognized as 
a fault or defect.  There are many ways that a bug can appear in a program, like faulty logic, 
access errors, or executing code with undefined behavior such as a buffer overflow. Buffer 
overflows can occur when an array is miscalculated somehow, this type of bug should be 
found by fuzzing. A vulnerability is a bug that in some way can introduce an opportunity for 
malicious use of the system. Bugs need to be examined to determine if they also can be a 
vulnerability, open to intruders.  
2.2 Code coverage 
In software testing, code coverage is often mentioned. Code coverage is the percentage of 
the total amount of code in a software, that is being tested by some testing method. Although 
100% code coverage should not be strived for [3], it can be used as a measure for how well 
tested the program is. High code coverage can be used as proof that the software is working 
as intended. Fuzzing can be used in many ways to gain a good code coverage or increases 
the code coverage of existing tests. 
2.3 Software testing 
The main categories in software testing are black, grey, and white box testing. The difference 
among these categories is determined by what level of information that is available to the 
tester. At one end is white-box which requires complete access to all the resources, source 
code, and specifications. At the other end is black-box, which requires no knowledge of the 
internal specifications and therefore is more of a blind test. In the middle is grey box testing. 
Grey-box can have many definitions depending on the situation, but it involves the tester 
having access to some additional information of the SUT, like compiled binaries. Fuzzing 
falls mostly into the grey box area because there are so many different approaches to fuzzing 
that it can cover the whole spectrum from white to black box. [2] This thesis involves testing 
of both white- and black-box fuzzing of software.   
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2.3.1 White-box testing 
An example of a pure white box testing is a source code review. A source code review can 
be done manually, line by line, but that is not practical to do on more extensive programs. 
The assist of automated tools is needed to go through all the code to find suspicious code, 
potentially bugs. Automated source code analyzers can detect a lot of potential risks that all 
need to be analyzed to decide if they are a real problem or not. [2] Fuzzing can be used as a 
white-box test to automatically test code to find real problems. That is when fuzzing is used 
on a system while using the source code to provide the fuzzer with internal information about 
the progress of the fuzzing.  
2.3.2 Black-box testing 
Black-box testing is done when the tester has a program, ready to use, where inputs can be 
made to the so-called black-box, and the output can be observed. In other words, black-box 
is how all conventional software is used by the end user. There is no knowledge of the inner 
workings of the black box. [2] 
Fuzzing can always be used as a black-box test if there is a way for the fuzzer to provide 
inputs to the program. Black box fuzzing is considered blind fuzzing; the fuzzer does not 
have any information about what is happening inside the application.  
2.3.3 Grey-box testing 
Grey box testing is right in between white and black box. Grey box testing is performed 
when you have some more in-depth knowledge of the system than the plain black box, but 
don’t have access to the source code or no purpose to do a white box test. Grey box testing 
may involve a black box with the additional reverse engineering of the binary. [2] 
Grey box fuzzing can be performed if some manipulation is done to the black-box binary. 
Some fuzzing tools can insert instrumentations into a pre-compiled binary, providing 
information to the fuzzer.   
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3 Fuzzing 
Fuzzing is an automated method for inserting unexpected, mutated, inputs to a system to test 
how well the system handles unexpected inputs. Fuzzing is about finding inputs that results 
in faults or undefined behaviors in the system under test (SUT). [2]  By inserting unexpected 
inputs, new unforeseen or rare code paths can get triggered, possibly finding unknown bugs, 
so-called zero-days. To find new code paths and bugs, some kind of random generator 
generates or mutates inputs to a system. A massive number of inputs is usually required to 
get any results; therefore automation must be used to feed new data as fast as possible. [4] 
If any faults are found during the fuzzing, the input causing the failure should be 
automatically saved. The faulty input can then be tested and analyzed to see precisely why 
that input causes problems.  
Fuzzing complements other testing methods, increasing the code coverage. Even when a 
system has been tested with good test cases, fuzzing can trigger new, unexpected execution 
flows. Fuzzing often finds bugs in corner cases, right at the edge between allowed and 
unallowed inputs, that otherwise may be hard to detect. Fuzzing should be used to test every 
input of the system, especially those accepting inputs from the internet or from files. [4] 
3.1 History of fuzzing 
Barton Miller is seen as the founder of the word fuzz testing and fuzzing, as Miller one night 
in 1988 realized how fragile programs could be: 
“Sitting in my apartment in Madison in the Fall of 1988, there was a wild Midwest thunderstorm 
pouring rain and lighting up the late night sky. That night, I was logged on to the Unix systems in 
my office via a dial-up phone line over a 1200 baud modem. With the heavy rain, there was noise on 
the line and that noise was interfering with my ability to type sensible commands to the shell and 
programs that I was running. It was a race to type an input line before the noise overwhelmed the 
command.  
This fighting with the noisy phone line was not surprising. What did surprise me was the fact that the 
noise seemed to be causing programs to crash. And more surprisingly to me was the programs that 
were crashing – common Unix utilities that we all use everyday.” [5] [6] 
After that night Barton Miller added a project to his class at the University of Wisconsin. 
The project was to make an automated script feeding random data to common Unix programs 
and make them crash. He settled on the term “fuzz” to describe the randomness of the testing 
method. [5] 
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Since then fuzzing has grown into a technique used by both hackers, cybersecurity, and 
software developers. The idea of fuzzing is to find bugs, by giving unexpected inputs to a 
program. A software developer might want to fix the bugs, to make a more robust software 
less likely to crash. Cybersecurity might want to know if the bugs are a potential security 
concern that needs to be fixed. A hacker might try to exploit a bug before it is fixed. It is a 
matter of who finds the bug first. Fuzzing has become a popular alternative since it can be 
applied to virtually any layer of the software. Many good open source fuzzing programs are 
available, and a few commercial ones.  
3.2 Implementing fuzzing 
Like other testing methods for software projects, fuzzing requires planning and maintenance 
to keep the fuzzing compatible with the system. Before beginning fuzzing on a project, 
several questions need to be evaluated and answered to make sure that the fuzzing will be 
successful.  
What kind of system is the target for the fuzzing? Fuzzing can be applied to any type of input 
that the SUT consumes. Inputs could be file input, network input, command line input, etc. 
What kind of problems are expected to be found? Fuzzing can be done for both quality and 
stability, and for cybersecurity. How big is the fuzzing project going to be? Smaller projects 
can be fuzzed on a local computer, while bigger projects would need a dedicated machine.  
3.2.1 Choose a target 
Before beginning to fuzz, different targets should be considered. Interesting targets for a 
fuzzer are programs, parsers, or libraries accepting external inputs. Inputs can be through 
external interfaces, like files or network connection, or internal functions in a library. [4] 
The availability of source code, or compiled binaries, should be considered, to know if a 
black box or white/grey box method can be used. The target should be the newest version of 
the software, that is where bugs most likely are found. [7] 
Fuzzing of the target can begin faster if there are ready-made basic code examples for the 
target. If there are existing test cases for the target, like a unit test, these can be a help in 
getting started on fuzzing. [7] 
An interface can contain many layers, often parsing and consistency checks are done before 
the actual data is handled. Therefore, when fuzzing, the part to be fuzzed needs to be defined. 
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Otherwise, the fuzzer might get stuck fuzzing one part, never reaching the interesting parts. 
[4]  
When fuzzing, speed is essential to get results in a decent time. A modern fuzzer can often 
do several thousands of test cycles per second. With access to the source code, there are 
several ways to speed up the fuzzing process. A program can be modified to bypass 
overhead, and pass fuzzed data directly to the target functionality. CRC checks, unnecessary 
logging, file input/output, or other time-consuming tasks can be disabled. This can be 
defined as a fuzz-friendly build of the SUT. But when altering the SUT, caution must be 
taken not to hide or create any bugs. Optimization should not be a priority. When a fuzzing 
system is up and running, ways to make optimizations can be considered. [4] Any bugs found 
should later be verified on an unaltered system. 
3.2.2 Scalability 
There are different ways to implement fuzzing to a system. The most straightforward way is 
a person running a fuzzing instance on his own machine, fuzzing a target program and 
manually checking if bugs have been found. In large-scale fuzzing, automation becomes 
essential. Fuzzing can be a part of a CI (Continuous Integration) system, automatically 
fuzzing different targets of the system, changing target a few times per day. When going 
large scale, the fuzzing can be executed by a cloud using many computers in parallel to 
automatically perform fuzzing. With many fuzzers running in parallel things like automatic 
reporting of findings and automatic minimization of test cases become essential. Before 
beginning large-scale fuzzing, planning must be done to ensure the usability of the fuzzer 
with different kinds of targets. [4] 
3.2.3 Starting 
To start fuzzing, the first thing to do is to define what kind of system that is going to be the 
target. By looking at the system, a rough list of requirements can be made for the fuzzer. The 
primary requirements are, what type of input does the system take, how is the input delivered 
to the system and if or how the system can be instrumented for instrumentation guided 
fuzzing. When the requirements are ready, it is time to search the internet for available 
fuzzers. There are a lot of open source fuzzers, freely available, and a few commercial ones. 
Open source fuzzers can work well in many situations and are readily accessible for anyone 
to try fuzzing. For an organization wanting to start fuzzing many products fast, a commercial 
fuzzer can be a good option. [4] 
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Commercial fuzzers usually deliver the whole package, test cases generation, injection, 
instrumentation, automation, and a user-friendly interface. They also come with readymade 
fuzzing solution for common protocols and file types.  
Open source fuzzers come in all different combinations of use cases. Some are made for a 
specific type of target; some are general purpose ready to go for common targets, some are 
framework-types used for the building of custom frameworks for the target. Some only 
deliver the test case generation, some also the injection of test cases, and some the full 
package with instrumentation and automation.  
3.2.4 Monitoring  
To know how the fuzzing is proceeding, the SUT must be monitored. The monitor provides 
information both to the fuzzer to improve the testing, and to the user to show statistics of 
how the fuzzer is doing. That leads to the big question of when to stop fuzzing a target. If 
the fuzzer has not found any new bugs for a relatively long time, it might be a good time to 
stop. The fuzzer could be stuck, not getting further, but at the same time, a new bug may be 
found if letting the fuzzer go for a while longer. With a coverage-guided fuzzer, it is a bit 
easier. As long as new code paths are being found, the fuzzer is doing good. If no new code 
paths have been found for a while, it is time to consider if the fuzzer is done. Either there are 
no more paths to be found in the target, with the current setup and environment, or the fuzzer 
is stuck at some hard to reach code path. If the SUT is built from source code, then fake bugs 
can be added to aid in tracking of the fuzzer. To verify that the fuzzer is traversing the code 
as expected, a print and abort function can be added at interesting points in the code. Make 
sure that the fake bugs do not block the fuzzer in any way. [4] When crashes have been found 
they can manually be further analyzed, with a software debugging tool, to trace precisely 
what is causing the crash.  
3.2.5 Maintenance 
For the fuzzing to be effective in the long run, maintenance is required. [4] When the fuzzer 
is stopped, it does not mean it is done fuzzing. There could still be bugs to discover. When 
fuzzing a new target, finding many new test cases, it is a good idea to stop the fuzzer at some 
point for maintenance. Depending on the fuzzer, a lot of good test cases could be saved by 
the fuzzer that can be analyzed and minimized to remove redundant test cases. These can 
then be run back to the fuzzer to make the fuzzing more efficient. [7]  
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3.2.6 Flexibility 
When choosing a fuzzer, the flexibility of it should be considered so that it can easily be 
adjusted for changes of the SUT. A flexible fuzzer is a fuzzer that requires no or little, 
configuration changes to target different types of systems. A lot of time is wasted if the 
fuzzing system must be remade when the SUT changes. A flexible fuzzer is also useful in 
the remark that different fuzzing approaches can find different issues. A flexible fuzzer can 
also support switching of components, such as instrumentation options. [4] 
3.3 Fuzzing methods 
There are some basic fuzzing methods, used in different variations by fuzzers. Fuzzers 
implements one or more methods to achieve the best results. The methods can be purely 
random, mutational, generational, or evolutionary which is based on both mutation and 
generation.  
3.3.1 Pure random 
An example of the most basic fuzzing method, yet sometimes effective: 
while[1]; do cat /dev/urandom | nc -vv target port; done 
[2] 
This command consists of an infinite loop streaming pseudo-random data to a target address 
and port. This simple random method has found faults in real software. The problem is to 
find which random data caused the fault, and the code coverage is shallow. Still, this is an 
easy way to test the basic robustness of a program, and demonstrates what fuzzing is. [2] 
3.3.2 Mutation 
A mutation based fuzzer is a brute force fuzzer, often called a dumb fuzzer. Little to no 
knowledge is needed about the SUT, file format or protocol. Brute force refers to the fuzzer 
taking in a valid sample of data, sequentially modifying every byte, word, string, etc., and 
sending that data to the target. [2] 
The fuzzer is improved by implementing some intelligence, like allowing parsing of the 
samples before mutation, to make sure that only specific parts of the data are mutated, not 
breaking the overall structure. [8]  
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It is a very straightforward method, although inefficient as is. By somewhat randomly 
modifying parts of the data it will take many iterations to get any results. Code coverage is 
dependent on having many good data samples, exercising different parts of the code because 
the mutations alone is unlikely to stumble into the deeper, more complex code paths. [2] 
Mutation is the core fuzzing algorithm behind many open source fuzzers, using smart 
algorithms to reach more complex code paths than mutation alone would. A code example 
of mutations can be found in the appendix.  
3.3.3 Generation 
Often called a smart fuzzer since generation requires knowledge of the data structure [8]. A 
generation based fuzzer generates inputs, test cases, based on a given specification of a file 
format or protocol. The goal of the generation is to generate test cases, containing some 
invalid data causing problems in the SUT, but still valid enough to not get instantly rejected. 
[9] Since generational fuzzers need specifications of the file format or protocol to be fuzzed, 
a framework of the specifications needs to be made. Creating a useful framework takes time, 
but can result in very efficient fuzzing. Commercial fuzzers are mostly based on generation, 
delivering readymade frameworks for all the common formats and protocol; offering to 
create custom frameworks for specific targets.  
Generation fuzzers often take a file format, or protocol and split it up into chunks. This 
allows single chunks to be fuzzed independently while keeping the overall structure of the 
data format. This makes the fuzzer able to get deeper into the SUT as it can generate 
sequences of valid inputs to specific parts of the communication. By knowing the 
specifications of the protocol used, the fuzzer is also able to give dynamic responses to 
communications when acting as a client/server. [8] 
3.3.4 Evolutionary 
Evolutionary fuzzers are the latest breed of fuzzers; they began to appear around the year 
2007 [10]. An evolutionary fuzzer uses advanced algorithms to get better code coverage, 
than plain mutation or generation. The evolutionary fuzzer still relies on either mutation or 
generation as the core functions for fuzzing the test cases. It uses some form of 
instrumentation of the binary to get information and guidance, to make smarter mutations to 
reach deeper into the SUT. By instrumenting the binary, the evolutionary fuzzer can track 
the code coverage of different test cases. [8] A white box fuzzer can insert instrumentations 
during the compilation of the SUT. There is also evolutionary fuzzers not dependent on the 
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source code. Instead, a grey-box approach can be used, debugging the target binary for code 
coverage and data. [10] 
By looking at the code coverage, the fuzzer can find out which part of the test case leads to 
which part of the code. The fuzzer gradually evolves, creating new test cases, covering 
increasingly more of the program code, with the goal of trying to find test cases with the best 
possible code coverage. [8] The test cases discovered by the evolutionary fuzzer is also a 
good source for test cases to be used in other situations. 
Evolutionary fuzzers often relies on genetic algorithms. [8] There are two types of 
algorithms used in evolutionary fuzzers, evolution strategies, and genetic algorithms. A 
combination of these can be used. Both try to generate the optimal test cases based on the 
previous generation of test cases. Evolution strategies use mutation, modifying parts of a 
good test case to create new ones. Genetic algorithms use two or more good test cases, cut 
them apart, combining them into new test cases. At that stage, a bit of mutation can be added 
to get more diversity in the test cases. The evolutionary fuzzer can then give different test 
cases a type of fitness score depending on metrics like code coverage and code depth. This 
score is used to determine if a test case should continue to the next stage of the evolution. 
[11] 
The author of AFL, Michal Zalewski, made an interesting demonstration of the concept of 
evolutionary fuzzing by “pulling JPEGs out of thin air”, using AFL. Zalewski made AFL 
feed a plain text file with the word “hello” to a simple JPEG image viewer. This is not how 
it is meant to be used since the text file was immediately rejected by the image parser. By 
observing binary instrumentations, the AFL fuzzer found the correct bytes for the header of 
a valid JPEG. Still not valid file, but the instrumentations showed that new code paths were 
triggered, indicating the fuzzer that is was on the right track. Using the header as seed, more 
parts of the JPEG structure was found. About six hours later the first entirely valid, grey-
scale, image was created. That was done on an 8-core system. But JPEG is still a simple file 
type, anything more complex would require a better starting test case to get any results in a 
decent time. [12] This is an example of how evolutionary fuzzers can be used without much, 
or any at all, knowledge of the file structure being fuzzed. 
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3.4 Types of fuzzing 
Since fuzzing can be done on many kinds of targets and layers, different fuzzing types can 
be defined to separate one fuzzing from another. On a high level, fuzzing can be divided into 
local fuzzing or remote fuzzing.  
3.4.1 Local 
Local fuzzing is performed on a local system that parses user inputs either directly or through 
a file. Local fuzzing can then be split into file format fuzzing or environment variable and 
command line fuzzing. File format fuzzing aims at a specific target’s ability to parses 
information from a file, trying to find flaws in the parsing. Similarly, a target can be fuzzed 
through command line arguments or environment variables [2]. This type of fuzzing is the 
most relevant type for an embedded system. Embedded systems can parse files or commands 
for, I.e., parameter or configuration inputs.  
3.4.2 Remote 
Remote fuzzing can either be seen on a general level, as network fuzzing, or a more specific 
level as a web application or server fuzzing. Network fuzzing aims at fuzzing a target over 
a network protocol. The target is fuzzed by mutating or generating fuzzed values, that are 
communicated over to the target through a network protocol while monitoring the behavior 
and response of the target. Network fuzzing tends to either target a specific protocol or be a 
generic framework type where the user needs to build a framework for the specified protocol. 
Due to the network protocol creating overhead, network fuzzing is considerably slower than 
local fuzzing. [2] On an embedded system, network fuzzing could be used if a network 
protocol is used by the system for any external or internal communication. 
Web application and server fuzzing. Web application fuzzing is a specific type of network 
protocol fuzzing, specialized on fuzzing HTTP packets for web applications. [2] Web 
applications is a common type of network fuzzing, and since can have its own category. On 
an embedded system, this type of fuzzing applies if the SUT hosts a web server.  
3.5 Limitations 
Fuzzing has a limited ability to find certain types of faults. Fuzzing is generally good at 
finding low hanging fruit, easy bugs, that make the program crash or hang. More complex 
bugs can be hard to detect with fuzzing. If the SUT contains checksums or encryption, a 
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brute-force fuzzer may get problems. A way to work around that is to disable those parts of 
the SUT [13]. A fuzzer cannot know if it somehow gained access to a backdoor allowing it 
to use administrator only code parts. If there is poor logic in the system, without resulting in 
any execution fault, then the fuzzer cannot detect that. If there is memory corruption but the 
system is made to handle them in such a way that the program exits without faults, then the 
fuzzer usually can’t detect that. [2] Fuzzing may also trigger other silent bugs such as, 
memory leaks, excessive CPU load, memory corruption, command injections, etc. [4] There 
are some tools available that can help the fuzzer in finding these kinds of problems, but they 
may be hard to apply, and slowing down the fuzzing process.  
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4 Fuzzers  
A fuzzer is the program that is performing the fuzzing, or fuzz testing. A typical fuzzing 
approach is described by the six steps listed below. A fully featured fuzzer should be able to 
do step 3, 4, 5, and aid in step 6. The rest is up to the user.  
1. Choose a target 
The target for the fuzzer can be a program, or any part of a system that is parsing inputs.  
2. Identify inputs 
Possible inputs to the SUT must be identified. Any inputs to the target should be considered, 
files, filenames, headers, variables, etc. Priority should be on user inputs.  
3. Generate data 
The fuzzing tool automatically either generate fuzzed data or mutate existing data as inputs 
to the target.  
4. Execute 
The fuzzing tool automatically sends the fuzzed data to the target and/or executes the target 
application with the fuzzed data.  
5. Monitor 
While fuzzing, the target must be monitored for any exceptions. If the target crashes, the 
fuzzer must know exactly which input data caused the crash.  
6. Analyzing the results 
Depending on the goal of the fuzzing, the results, crashes, can be used in different ways. The 
data causing the crash should be tested and confirmed, to determine if the faults can be 
reproduced in a real situation, and needs to be fixed. If security is concerned, a security 
expert should decide if the fault could be exploitable. [2] 
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4.1 Comparison factors 
To evaluate fuzzing, different fuzzing software available need to be examined. To make a 
comparison of the fuzzers, a small set of essential factors are highlighted for each fuzzer. 
Below is a model-list of the comparison factors used.  
Availability  Open source / free / commercial  
Support Is the fuzzer still alive and in active 
development? Does the fuzzer have an 
active community of users? Forums? 
Operating system Linux / Windows 
System requirements for feedback-driven 
(white-/grey-box) fuzzing mode  
Software compiler supported, or hardware 
required  
Type File / variable / protocol / network / web 
Mutation / generation   
 
To find available fuzzers google was used to search for keywords. Open source fuzzers are 
the most common, but many projects have not been updated in several years, and thus focus 
is on finding up to date and active fuzzers.  Here is a list of the most promising fuzzers that 
were found, that are up to date and in active development. 
4.2 American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) 
Availability Open source  
Support Active development, and a mailing list 
(forum) with a few user posts per week. 
Operating system Linux 
System requirements for feedback-driven 
(white-/grey-box) fuzzing mode 
Source code compiled with GCC or Clang. 
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Type Evolutionary file fuzzer, based on coverage-
guided mutations.  
 
AFL is an open source evolutionary file-fuzzer using genetic algorithms. To use AFL's full 
potential, the source code for the SUT needs to be available, although it can be used without 
source code as a black-box test. AFL has its own compilers, that is used to compile the 
program while inserting small pieces of code into the program allowing AFL to track all the 
code paths in the program. Although AFL tracks code coverage, it is not shown in a human-
readable way. To monitor actual code coverage an external tool, afl-cov, can be used. [13] 
AFL is an instrumentation-guided genetic fuzzer, capable of synthesizing a wide range of 
file inputs for targets. It is built around mutation of test cases that have been found to generate 
the most efficient results. AFL has a user-friendly interface and requires almost no 
adjustments by the user [14] AFL works best with programs written in C or C++ [7].  
4.3 Honggfuzz 
Availability Open source  
Support Active development, inactive mailing list. 
Operating system Linux / Windows / OS X / Android 
System requirements for feedback-driven 
(white-/grey-box) fuzzing mode 
Software compiled with Clang or GCC. Or 
an Intel CPU with support for BTS or PT 
process tracing.  
Type Evolutionary, coverage-guided, mutational, 
in-process fuzzer.  
 
Honggfuzz is an easy to use, evolutionary, coverage-guided, fuzzer. It is multi-threaded, to 
automatically utilize available processing power. Honggfuzz can run white-, black-, or grey-
box fuzzing. For process tracing, either software or hardware can be used. Software tracing 
is done by instrumenting the binary during compilation, like AFL, while hardware tracing is 
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supported on a relatively new Intel CPU with support for the process tracing techniques BTS, 
or PT. [15] 
Uses persistent in-process fuzzing, repeatedly calling an input function with fuzzed data, 
without restarting the SUT. If in-process fuzzing cannot be used, the more standard fuzzing 
mode can be used where the process is restarted after every input, but this is slower than the 
in-process mode. [15] 
4.4 LibFuzzer 
Availability Open source, part of the LLVM suite  
Support Active development, and a mailing list 
(forum) with a few user posts per week. 
Operating system Linux / Windows   
System requirements for feedback-driven 
(white-/grey-box) fuzzing mode 
Source code compiled with clang 
Type Evolutionary, in-process, coverage-guided  
Other  Originally inspired by AFL, therefore 
containing many similarities  
 
LibFuzzer is an in-process library fuzzer, closely inspired by AFL. [14] It is an evolutionary 
coverage-guided fuzzer for fuzzing libraries and functions. LibFuzzer is provided as part of 
the LLVM suite. Clang is used for compilation as binary coverage information is provided 
by LLVM’s SanitizerCoverage binary instrumentation. [16]  
In-process fuzzing relies on executing the target function inside a loop. This is faster than 
running the whole program for every new input or using fork servers (as standard AFL does). 
When using in-process fuzzing, the program could crash because of memory corruption from 
previous inputs. Address sanitizer is used to detect and handle memory corruptions. [16] 
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4.5 Peach fuzzer  
Availability A commercial edition, and a free open 
source edition 
Support Commercial edition comes with dedicated 
support. The open source edition has e 
support forum, which is very inactive. 
Operating system Linux / Windows / OS X 
System requirements for feedback-driven 
(white-/grey-box) fuzzing mode 
- 
Type Generational framework fuzzer 
 
Peach fuzzer is a commercial framework-type, generational, fuzzer. They also deliver Peach 
Community which is a free to use, open source, version. The open source edition has fewer 
features and not much development. The commercial edition is based on the original open 
source edition, with many improvements. The generational framework type fuzzer requires 
the building of a custom framework for the SUT. The framework explains the structure of 
the data that is being fuzzed so that the fuzzer know which parts should be mutated and 
which should not. Building a framework can be effective for fuzzing a specific target. The 
commercial version comes loaded with pre-made frameworks for all kinds of standard 
protocols and data structures. [17] 
4.6 Defensics Fuzz Testing  
Availability Commercial 
Support Official support and an active support forum 
Operating system Linux / Windows / OS X 
System requirements for feedback-driven 
(white-/grey-box) fuzzing mode 
- 
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Type Generational framework fuzzer 
 
Synopsys Fuzz Testing, Defensics, also known as Codenomicon Defensics is a commercial 
generation based fuzzer. It delivers many pre-made test suites for protocols and file formats. 
It also provides a fuzzing framework for testing of custom file formats or protocols. [18] 
4.7 Burp Suite  
Availability Fully featured commercial edition, 329€ / 
year / user. Free edition available, limited in 
speed and features. A free 30-day trial for 
business users.  
Support Support center available on the software’s 
homepage, with lots of information and 
tutorials. Active community forum. 
Operating system Windows / Linux  
System requirements for feedback-driven 
(white-/grey-box) fuzzing mode 
-  
Type Web application scanner with web fuzzing 
capabilities  
 
Portswigger’s burp suite is a platform for fuzzing and security testing of web applications. 
The suit includes many different tools for security testing. There are two versions available 
of Burp Suite, Professional, and community. Professional consists of the full platform, for a 
yearly price per user. A free trial period of 30 days is available for business users. The free 
community edition contains most of the tools, but with very limited speed. [19] 
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5 Implementation 
Fuzzing can be implemented in a wide range of situations. Black-, grey-, and white box. 
When fuzzing is implemented as a black box test, it is considered blind with no details of 
the internal state of the target [2]. Grey and white box fuzzers can get additional information 
by monitoring the internal state of the target, such as code coverage, to increase the 
efficiency of the fuzzing.  
Implementation tests will be made with a file fuzzer, on programs reading inputs from files. 
Both black- and white-box approaches will be tested, to verify what the differences are. All 
testing will be executed inside a virtual Linux machine.  
5.1 Choosing test method 
To evaluate fuzzing as a test method, American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) was chosen for 
implementation testing. AFL was selected since it is a well-suited fuzzer for the type of 
system that is being tested; a local system reading inputs from a file, with source code 
available to build from. It is an easy to use, well tested and documented fuzzer, allowing for 
more time spent on testing, and less on setting up the fuzzer. To give a clearer understanding 
of how a fuzzer works, a small test program was made for testing. The test program was 
tailored for use with a file-fuzzer, like AFL, to make initial tests before running AFL on the 
real system.  
5.2 Using AFL 
AFL has a few modes and options that can be used, but in these tests, the most standard 
setups will be used. Per the AFL manual [13] the following steps are taken to start a basic 
fuzzing session with AFL; 
1. To use AFL for fuzzing an application the target needs to receive data from standard 
input or a file; or modified to do so. For AFL to detect faults, the target must crash 
properly when encountering a fault.  
2. Compile the target using afl-gcc, or afl-g++.  
3. Collect one or more, as small as possible, valid input files for the target. These files 
are the starting point for the fuzzer to mutate from.  
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4. Start the fuzzing. The basic way of fuzzing a program reading from standard input 
would be: “./afl-fuzz -i testcase_dir -o findings_dir -- \ /path/to/tested/program 
[...program's command line...]” 
5. Wait for the results.  
So, before starting AFL, an input and an output folder should be created. The input folder 
should be filled with valid test files for the SUT. The output folder is where AFL will store 
all of its data and findings. When AFL starts, it will read and test all the files in the input 
folder, to validate them, and then copy the test files to a folder named queue inside the output 
folder. The files in the queue folder are what AFL is going to use as test cases to mutate 
during the fuzzing. If during testing, a mutated test case is found to trigger a new path, then 
that test case is going to be added to the queue folder. Inside the output directory, are also 
two folders named crash, and hangs. If a test case is found to trigger a crash, or a hang, of 
the SUT, then that test case is going to be added to the respective folder. A test that triggers 
a crash, or hangs, is not going to be inserted to the queue.  
Below is a basic example of the command line that is going to be used for most of the coming 
tests.  
afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./o/ ./path/to/SUT [SUT options] @@ 
“-i ./i/” means the input folder is named ‘i’, while “-o ./o/” means the output folder is named 
‘o’. Next comes the path to the SUT, possible options (arguments) for the SUT, and finally 
@@ is the place where the SUT normally would expect a file to be inserted. That is where 
the fuzzer automatically will insert mutated files.  
When AFL is run for the first time, the fuzzer will probably stop with an error message about 
the handling of core dumps. The file core_pattern, located at /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern 
needs to contain the word “core”, for AFL to gain direct access to information about a 
program crashing. An easy way to edit the file is by using the following command: sudo 
sysctl -w kernel.core_pattern=core 
5.2.1 Understanding AFL’s status screen 
This section explains the important details of AFL’s status screen, and how to interpret the 
data.  
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Figure 1. Example of AFL status screen 
The status screen provides lots of information in a compact layout; the essential parts will 
be explained here. Detailed information about the status screen can be found in the AFL 
documentation, provided with the source code. At the top of the screen, the version of AFL 
is shown together with the name of the program that is being fuzzed.  
The first thing to notice is the process timing box. This gives information about the total time 
the fuzzer has been running, and time since last new path, unique crash, or unique hang, was 
found. A new path means the fuzzer has found a new path in the program code. A unique 
crash implies a crash has been found on a code path that has not crashed in a previous case. 
A unique hang is essentially the same as a unique crash, except a hang means the program 
was unresponsive for more than a set amount of time without properly crashing.  
Next thing to notice is the overall results box. It informs about total test cycles done, total 
paths, unique crashes, and unique hangs. Total test cycles mean the total amount of times 
AFL has cycled through all its test on all paths found. The test program is minimal and fast; 
therefore, it has a cycle count of 10.1k (10 100). On a complex system, the first cycle could 
take more than a day. The number is now displayed in green since AFL considers itself done 
and probably will not find any new things. Total paths are the total number of paths that AFL 
has located in the program code. Unique crashes and hangs are the total number of crashes 
or hangs that have been found on a unique code path.  
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The rest of the status screen contains more in-depth information about the fuzzing session. 
There are mainly two variables essential for the average user. Execution speed, showing the 
number of times the program is re-executed per second; a higher number means faster 
fuzzing. Lastly total crashes; the total amounts of tests that have made the program crash, 
and how many of those are considered unique. A high number of non-unique crashes means 
many different test cases crash in the same execution-path. Only the unique crashes, and 
hangs, are saved in the output folder of AFL.  
5.3 Initial testing 
To evaluate how a fuzzer can be used, and get a clearer picture of fuzzing, a small test 
program, called fuzzTester, was made. In Figure 2, below, is the source code for fuzzTester.c 
together with comments trying to explain the code. 
 
Figure 2. The source code of the test program, fuzzTester 
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The test program, fuzzTester was made to be used with a file format fuzzer. Simulating a 
program reading data from a text file, provided via the command line. The program contains 
two buffer overflows and one simulated crash, aborting the program execution. The program 
consists of several nested if statements, to make it a bit challenging for a fuzzer. For 
coverage-guided fuzzers, like AFL, the number of different paths that can be taken thru a 
program is essential. Therefore, path numbers are added in red color to illustrate that if the 
previous criteria is met, then path number x will be triggered.  
The program reads a file containing a string of characters, saving the first 6 characters to a 
buffer. The string is then tested, one character at a time. If the first character is correct, the 
program will proceed to check the next character, and so on. If a character in the string does 
not match the check, then the program will end successfully. If the string is “abcdef”, it will 
result in a crash. If the string starts with “abcx” or “abcdx” it will result in a buffer overflow, 
but not necessarily a crash. The goal of the program is to test how a fuzzer can find the 
correct string, “abcdef”, to make the program crash and thereby find the simulated bug, and 
also to see how the buffer overflows are handled.  
The starting point for a fuzzer, fuzzing this program, should be an empty file. Then the fuzzer 
has to mutate the whole file to make progress in the test program. Every new if-statement, 
and thereby code path, only requires the fuzzer to hit one specific character right. This makes 
for an easy target for a coverage-guided fuzzer, continuously finding new paths to start from. 
For a black-box fuzzer, without guidance or any good starting test case, the final crash would 
be impossible to find. To find the final crash, it would require the fuzzer to, randomly, make 
up a string starting with “abcdef”. A black-box fuzzer would likely only trigger the most 
shallow code paths (paths 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 2.).  
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5.3.1 Black-box 
For the first test of the application, a black-box approach was used. In Figure 3 is a flow-
chart of black-box testing of the program fuzzTester. The Figure illustrates how the fuzzer 
starts with adding files from the input folder, into the queue. In the illustration, two input 
cases are added. One empty test case, and one longer, “better”, closer to the goal to make it 
a bit easier for the fuzzer. Each time the SUT is executed, the fuzzer chooses one of the test 
cases in the queue to mutate (to fuzz). A few examples of what the fuzzed file might end up 
like is shown in the green boxes. The fuzzed file is then sent to the SUT, which is monitored 
to see if it ends successfully or in a crash. Since this is a black-box test, without guidance, 
the queue folder will not get updated with any new tests, other than those provided from the 
start. 
 
Figure 3. A basic illustration of black-box fuzzing the fuzzTester application, with AFL  
 
In the first black-box test, only one empty file was used as input to AFL. The following 
command was used to start the fuzzing. The “-n” is added to inform AFL that it should run 
in non-instrumented mode, also known as black-box. 
afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./AFL_tests/gcc_standard/ -n ./fuzztester_gcc @@ 
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Figure 4. Black-box fuzzing of fuzzTester 
The fuzzer was run for five hours, but as expected from this test, nothing interesting was 
found. 
For the next test, the same black-box scenario as previous was used. Except for this time, 
instead of using only an empty file as input test case, a better file was used; “abczzz”. This 
will give the fuzzer a head-start, deeper into the fuzzTester program.  
afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./AFL_tests/gcc_standard_good_test_case/ -n ./fuzztester_gcc @@ 
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Figure 5. Black-box fuzzing of fuzzTester, with a good starting test case 
This time the results were more interesting. The fuzzer kept finding crashing inputs, every 
few minutes. The fuzzer was run for more than one day to get a good sample of test results.  
By looking through all the 298 cases, it was found out that every crashing input starts with 
“abcdx” which means they crash at the write overflow. Many of the cases were identical, 
most commonly “abcdxz”; which shows that the fuzzer does not automatically remove 
identical test results. This also shows that the fuzzer can easily mutate two correct characters; 
mutates “abczzz” into “abcdxz”. Very close to the final goal, “abcdef”, but still it was not 
found. One case did stand out from the rest, a bunch of unknown characters making the 
program crash; “扡摣ၸ硤成扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢拿扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢扢b”. 
The test was later run for one more day, without any new results.  
5.3.2 White-box 
For the following tests, a white-box fuzzing approach is used. In Figure 6 is a flow-chart of 
white-box testing of the test program. The basics are the same as with the black-box approach 
shown in Figure 3. The difference here is that instrumentations are used to give AFL’s 
monitoring part more information of the internal execution of the test application. With that 
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information, the fuzzer knows when a new path gets triggered. When a new path is triggered, 
the queue folder in automatically updated with the test case that triggered that new path. 
These new test cases can then be used as starting points for coming mutations.  
 
Figure 6. A basic illustration of how the test program is fuzzed by AFL, with the help of instrumentations 
For testing AFL was used and the target, fuzzTester.c, was compiled with afl-gcc in a few 
different ways. Afl-gcc is the same as the standard gcc compiler plus binary 
instrumentations. Afl-gcc uses environment variables for compilation options, which can be 
set right before the compilation. According to the AFL-documentations [20], afl-gcc uses 
strict optimizations by default. For my simple test program, AFL_DONT_OPTIMIZE=1 has 
to be set to ignore all optimizations. My test program is too simple so otherwise vital parts 
of it would be optimized, ignored.  
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For some parts of the test, address sanitizer will be used to help the fuzzer to detect buffer 
overflows. Address sanitizer is a tool that, during compilation,  adds instrumentations that 
will detect if any memory corruption happens. When using address sanitizer, 
AFL_USE_ASAN=1 must be set. Also, Because of the way address sanitizer uses memory, 
the target must be compiled in 32bit mode, therefore -m32 is added [20]. All tests were run 
as single instances, on one processor core.  
For the first test, the program fuzzTester.c was compiled with standard settings, non-
optimized, 64-bit.  
Command used to compile: env AFL_DONT_OPTIMIZE=1 afl-gcc fuzzTester.c 
Program was named: fuzzTester_afl-gcc_dont_optimize 
Command used to run the fuzzer: afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./AFL_tests/afl-gcc_dont_optimize/ 
./fuzzTester_afl-gcc_dont_optimize @@ 
The command is the standard for running a single fuzzing instance on a target reading from 
a file. The fuzzed file gets inserted in place of the @@. The directory ./i/ should contain 
good test cases for the SUT. In this case, it contained only one empty file, which is good 
enough for this small test.  
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Figure 7. White-box fuzzing of fuzzTester, 64-bit.  
The fuzzer was run for 2 hours, although no new paths or crashes were found past the first 3 
minutes. The crashes found were on; “abcdef” the final abort, and “abcdx” the write 
overflow. It did not crash on the read overflow, “abcx”.  
Most embedded systems are compiled in 32bit rather than 64bit. The following test is the 
same as above, except it was compiled in 32bit instead of 64bit.  
Command used to compile: env AFL_DONT_OPTIMIZE=1 afl-gcc fuzzTester.c -m32 
Program was named: fuzzTester_afl-gcc_32bit_dont_optimize 
Command used to run the fuzzer: afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./AFL_tests/afl-gcc_32bit_dont_optimize/ 
./fuzzTester_afl-gcc_32bit_dont_optimize @@ 
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Figure 8. White-box fuzzing of fuzzTester, 32-bit. 
This time the fuzzer only found the final crash, not the buffer write overflow which was 
found in 64bit mode. It did traverse the code paths containing the overflows, that can be 
confirmed by looking in the queue folder in the AFL output directory. The folder contains 
all possible test cases as different files containing the text: “”, “a”, “ab”, “abc”, “abcd”, 
“abcx”, “abcdx”, “abcde”, and the crash folder containing the crashing case “abcdef”.  
For the final test, address sanitizer was used. 
Command used to compile: env AFL_USE_ASAN=1 AFL_DONT_OPTIMIZE=1 afl-gcc 
fuzzTester.c -fsanitize=address -m32 
Program was named: fuzzTester_afl-gcc_32bit_asan_dont_optimize 
Command used to run the fuzzer: afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./AFL_tests/afl-
gcc_32bit_asan_dont_optimize/ -m 600 ./fuzzTester_afl-gcc_32bit_asan_dont_optimize 
@@ 
When using address sanitizer, a lot of virtual memory is allocated. Therefore -m 600 needs 
to be set to increase the memory limit for the process to 600mb (any less and it will crash 
before it even starts).  
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Figure 9. White-box fuzzing of fuzzTester, 32-bit, address sanitizer activated 
This time the fuzzer was able to find all the crashes, as expected when using address 
sanitizer. The downside of using address sanitizer was that the execution speed was 
significantly decreased, from 4000 executions per second down to 1000. To gain additional 
insights the tool afl-plot was used to create a plot of when the crashes were found. The plot 
shows that the first crash, “abcx”, was found fast while there was a long time between the 
two last findings, requiring close to two days to find all crashes.  
 
Figure 10. A plot of crashes over time 
5.4 Testing on internal software 
The software chosen for testing is a command line program, parsing XML files, parameter 
files, and command line parameters. The program outputs a compressed binary 
representation of the input file and parameters. This type of file can then provide the 
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parameters to the embedded system. From here on the program tested will be referred to as 
the system under test, SUT.  
The reasons why it was chosen are; it is a good target for a local fuzzer like AFL, it is a 
simple and small program so that focus can be put on actually fuzzing rather than setting up 
the system to be able to fuzz. The SUT is used in internal development only and since may 
contain more easy bugs to find.  
There are at least three layers that can be targeted in the SUT; parsing of XML files, 
parameter files, or command line parameters. For this test, the parameter file was chosen as 
the target input. Those files are small and simple, basically some lines of parameters. That 
makes for an excellent fuzzing target. Compared to an XML file which is relatively big with 
texts that need to be correctly formatted, that makes for a more difficult target for a fuzzer. 
Command line parameters could also be a target, but bugs found in a command line is not 
as exciting as those found in a file, and AFL only supports command line fuzzing on an 
experimental stage.  
5.4.1 Black-box 
For the first test, a black-box approach was used. As input test case, only one short valid test 
file was used. The file, containing the parameter-string, “100663296 11 0”, was put into the 
input folder. 
The fuzzing was started with the command: afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./o/ -n ./path/to/SUT [SUT 
options] @@ 
The “-n” parameter informs AFL that it should run in non-instrumented mode or black box 
mode. The @@ will be automatically replaced with a fuzzed file.  
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Figure 11. Black-box fuzzing of the SUT 
The first thing to notice here is that the last new path is not available when doing a black box 
test. That means the fuzzer is blind to what paths are taken in the program. Also, the 
execution speed is very slow, probably due to the huge amount of timeouts, ”total tmouts” 
in Figure 11. In this test, the program is considered timeout if the execution of the program 
takes more than 50ms.  
No crashes were found, but many hangs. A hang occurs when the program times out for 
much longer than 50ms, about 1s or more. The high amount of ”unique” hangs found are 
due to the fuzzer being blind, fuzzing a black-box. Many of them can be identical cases or 
similar. The test cases producing hangs are saved in the output directory in a folder named 
hangs. “./o/hangs/” 
By manually running the SUT program with a few test files from the hangs folder, they were 
confirmed to indeed hang the program. The cause of the hangs could be evaluated, by quickly 
looking through all the files in the hangs folder. It appears that the program correctly refuses 
files that are not the correct length and format since there is no really deformed test case. 
But the program hangs if there is a non-numerical character, in a correct format.  
Samples that will produce a hang; 1?0663296 11 0 : 1006N3296 11 0 : 100663296 11/0 
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5.4.2 White-box 
For the next test, the SUT was built with AFL instrumentations to make a white-box 
approach to fuzzing. The C compiler was set to afl-gcc, and the C++ compiler was set to afl-
g++.  
The command used to launch the fuzzer is the same as in the previous test, except this time 
without the -n parameter. Instrumentations inserted by AFL during the building of the 
program is used.  
The fuzzing was started with the command: afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./o/ ./path/to/SUT [SUT options] 
@@ 
 
Figure 12. White-box fuzzing of the SUT 
As can be seen in the bottom of Figure 12, the fuzzer aborted the process after running over 
15h, because it was out of memory (OOM). This could be a side effect of fuzzing. Running 
a process millions of times with manipulated inputs could result in memory leaks. But that 
is not a problem, the results so far can be analyzed, and the fuzzer can quickly be restarted 
from where it was stopped.  
By looking at the status screen, this approach does have the same problems as the earlier 
black-box test. The execution speed is slow, and most tests result in timeouts. But this time, 
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with the help of white-box instrumentations, the fuzzer can track the paths taken in the 
program. Total 101 paths have been found, and 5 unique hangs, no crashes. 
Hangs found: °00663296 11 0 : 000663296 11 0\8A : 000663296 11 0 : 
 100661 066+2 6 12+2\B9 : ±00663294 11 0 
The results seem to be the same as with the black-box test, except this time there were only 
5 unique hangs, instead of 500. Making the results easier to interpret.  
One unexpected result here is the stability value, which can be seen in red in Figure 12’s 
lower right corner. Per the AFL documentation [20], the stability shows the consistency of 
observed traces. The stability should be at 100% when the system behaves in the same way 
for the exact same input. If it is lower than 100%, that means that the SUT in some cases 
behaves differently although the same input is used. A small drop in the stability value can 
be normal, but a bigger drop, as in this case shown in red can be a problem for the fuzzers 
performance. There can be several reasons to a low stability value; some functionality can 
be designed to behave randomly, the program might try to manipulate leftover temporary 
files or memory, or the application might use uninitialized memory that somehow gains 
random values.  
 
Figure 13. Continuation of the previous test 
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The test was continued for one more day, without any new results.  
Next step was to do a test with address sanitizer activated. That should detect if there is any 
memory corruption. The SUT was compiled as before, but with address sanitizer on. Before 
starting the fuzzer, the test cases produced by the previous fuzzing round was run through 
an AFL tool, afl-cmin, to minimize the test cases deleting redundant tests. 101 tests were 
minimized to 36. These 36 test cases were put into the input folder, to give a good starting 
point for the next fuzzing session. 
The test is started with the same command line as before, except now with -m 700. Address 
sanitizer requires a lot of memory; therefore, the memory limit of the process is increased to 
700mb.  
afl-fuzz -i ./i/ -o ./o/ -m 700 ./path/to/SUT [SUT options] @@ 
 
Figure 14. Fuzzing of the SUT, compiled with instrumentations from AFL and address sanitizer 
Using address sanitizer did not yield any different results than previous tests. The same few 
hangs, all with the same characteristics. Interestingly though the stability value was better.  
Lastly, some changes were made to the source code, to disable parts of the program, to get 
a more fuzz-friendly target. The components that were disabled were; CRC checks, reading 
of the XML file, and writing of the output file. The program should now contain fewer 
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obstacles for the fuzzer to go over, leaving more time for the tested functionality, parsing of 
the parameter file. This time the fuzzer was run without address sanitizer.  
 
Figure 15. Fuzzing of a more fuzz-friendly version of the SUT 
The results from this fuzz-friendly SUT were generally no different from previous tests. The 
same types of hangs were found. The change is that the execution speed is doubled, but still 
quite slow and with the same number of timeouts. A more significant change can be seen in 
the stability value, which is now at 100%. Apparently, some of the disabled features did link 
to the stability issue, but that did not seem to change the outcome.  
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6 Results 
The tests were successful in giving a picture of how a fuzzer can be used, and what kind of 
problems that can occur. The initial tests showing how fuzzing should behave in a good 
scenario, while the later tests show that it is not as easy with a real software. When fuzzing 
the internal software, SUT, no crashes were found, but a few ways to make the SUT hang 
were discovered. Although finding crashes is the primary objective of fuzzing, hangs are 
equally important to detect to maintain a stable program. The way the hangs were triggered 
was trivial, which confirms what fuzzing is best at; catching the low hanging fruit.  
6.1 Black- or white-box 
White-box fuzzing should uncover more in-depth bugs in the SUT, but in this test, it did not, 
although it did show its strength on the initial small test program. The problems found in the 
SUT were shallow bugs that could be found easily by both a black- and white-box test. White 
box did provide more information and a smaller and better filtered batch of test results. That 
means there is less work with interpreting the results.  
6.2 Address sanitizer 
Although address sanitizer did prove useful in the initial small test program, it did not yield 
any further results when used on the SUT. Using address sanitizer significantly slows down 
the fuzzing process, as shown by the initial testing, increasing the time it takes to make a full 
fuzzing of the system. Other than time consumption, there is no known downside to using 
address sanitizer. So, if memory corruptions, like buffer overflows, are suspected or if time 
is not a problem, address sanitizer should be used.  
6.3 Chosen method 
AFL was well suited as a test method on the selected test application. No reason could be 
found as to how any other tool would have performed better, on this implementation. In the 
tests, the compilers gcc and g++ were used. If the compilers were replaced by the clang 
compiler, new options would be available. Especially LibFuzzer, or Honggfuzz which are 
more focused on clang.  
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6.4 Further testing 
To get a more conclusive result, more testing would need to be done. Either other systems 
could be tested, or more approaches could be tested on the same SUT. In these tests the SUT 
was only tested through the parameters file, tests could also be made on the XML file. To 
get a more efficient fuzzing a fuzz-friendly build was tested, more testing could be made that 
way by gaining more knowledge about the inner workings of the SUT. With good knowledge 
about the SUT, strategical changes could be made in the source code to create a better fuzz-
friendly build of the SUT. A fuzz-friendly build would strive for a system without 
unnecessary checks, file writing, or other time-consuming tasks while keeping the core 
functionality that is being tested intact.  
All tests were done as single tasks, running on a single CPU core. Parallelization can quickly 
be done with a fuzzer, to utilize all available CPU cores. That would increase the fuzzing 
speed, to gain results faster.  
If fuzzing were to be taken into use for further software testing, the developers would be in 
a key position to spot core functionality, suitable for fuzzing. Core functions could then be 
fuzzed throughout the development, to find at least the easy bugs quickly. Even an easy bug 
could cause significant problems if it is not found during development.  
7 Conclusion 
The results of the tests show that fuzzing can be a promising tool for testing software on an 
embedded system. On a well-tested system, it can be challenging to find new bugs. Since 
fuzzing is best at finding easy bugs, fuzzing would be best when used from the beginning of 
a project, using a fuzzer to find low hanging fruit quickly.  
Fuzzing is a versatile tool for software testing. Fuzzing can be targeted to almost any part of 
a system, or piece of the code if there is enough knowledge about the SUT. This makes 
fuzzing into a great tool to have knowledge about, to be able to implement it when given the 
right situation.  
This thesis will be used as a reference to what fuzzing is, and how it can be used. Fuzzing 
will be considered for future use in the department and compared to other testing methods. 
It can also be used as a reference point in the future, to see how fuzzing has changed over 
time.  
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8 Discussion 
There are many sides of fuzzing. Fuzzing can be quick and easy to implement, or it may 
require lots of pre-work before starting. Fuzzing may find some bugs, but maybe not all. 
When fuzzing, and not finding bugs, it is difficult to know if the system actually does not 
contain bugs. The fuzzer might merely not be targeting the right spot, or set up in the right 
way, to find the bug.  
Fuzzing as a technique is a moving subject. There are new open source fuzzers appearing, 
often improving some specific part of the fuzzing. But many of those lack the commitment 
to keep them updated, and thus they get outdated, or the new technique gets merged and used 
in a bigger project.  
What I have learned from this is that even though fuzzing is a small relatively unknown 
subject of a to me unknown subject, software testing, there were plenty of rabbit holes to 
jump down into and get lost. When reading about new implementations of the subject, it was 
easy to lose track of the scope of this thesis. To get work done, prioritizations need to be 
done to keep the focus on what is essential.  
While writing this thesis, a lot of time was put on understanding the basics. Also learning 
how to target different systems, and how to set up the system to be able to fuzz, took more 
time than expected. With that knowledge, further testing could focus more on testing 
different fuzzing approaches in varying situations.  
For further reading on the subject, I would like to have the chance to read the book “Fuzzing 
for Software Security Testing and Quality Assurance, 2nd Edition” Released February 2018. 
The release was too late for it to be used for this thesis. This book is significantly newer than 
previous books on the subject, covering more modern fuzzing methods as evolutionary 
fuzzing and AFL.  
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Appendix 
This is a code example of fuzzing, extracted from American Fuzzy Lop’s afl-fuzz.c. AFL 
consists of many fuzzing stages, as seen in the list below. Due to the size of the code, only 
one stage, random havoc, is added here as a reference. Random havoc is an example of 
random brute-force mutation of an input file. The code has comments for every stage, with 
a short description of what is happening.  
 
/* Fuzzing stages */ 
 
enum { 
  /* 00 */ STAGE_FLIP1, 
  /* 01 */ STAGE_FLIP2, 
  /* 02 */ STAGE_FLIP4, 
  /* 03 */ STAGE_FLIP8, 
  /* 04 */ STAGE_FLIP16, 
  /* 05 */ STAGE_FLIP32, 
  /* 06 */ STAGE_ARITH8, 
  /* 07 */ STAGE_ARITH16, 
  /* 08 */ STAGE_ARITH32, 
  /* 09 */ STAGE_INTEREST8, 
  /* 10 */ STAGE_INTEREST16, 
  /* 11 */ STAGE_INTEREST32, 
  /* 12 */ STAGE_EXTRAS_UO, 
  /* 13 */ STAGE_EXTRAS_UI, 
  /* 14 */ STAGE_EXTRAS_AO, 
  /* 15 */ STAGE_HAVOC, 
  /* 16 */ STAGE_SPLICE 
}; 
 
 
  /**************** 
   * RANDOM HAVOC * 
   ****************/ 
 
havoc_stage: 
 
  stage_cur_byte = -1; 
 
  /* The havoc stage mutation code is also invoked when splicing files; 
if the 
     splice_cycle variable is set, generate different descriptions and 
such. */ 
 
  if (!splice_cycle) { 
 
    stage_name  = "havoc"; 
    stage_short = "havoc"; 
    stage_max   = (doing_det ? HAVOC_CYCLES_INIT : HAVOC_CYCLES) * 
                  perf_score / havoc_div / 100; 
 
  } else { 
 
    static u8 tmp[32]; 
 
    perf_score = orig_perf; 
 
    sprintf(tmp, "splice %u", splice_cycle); 
    stage_name  = tmp; 
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    stage_short = "splice"; 
    stage_max   = SPLICE_HAVOC * perf_score / havoc_div / 100; 
 
  } 
 
  if (stage_max < HAVOC_MIN) stage_max = HAVOC_MIN; 
 
  temp_len = len; 
 
  orig_hit_cnt = queued_paths + unique_crashes; 
 
  havoc_queued = queued_paths; 
 
  /* We essentially just do several thousand runs (depending on 
perf_score) 
     where we take the input file and make random stacked tweaks. */ 
 
  for (stage_cur = 0; stage_cur < stage_max; stage_cur++) { 
 
    u32 use_stacking = 1 << (1 + UR(HAVOC_STACK_POW2)); 
 
    stage_cur_val = use_stacking; 
  
    for (i = 0; i < use_stacking; i++) { 
 
      switch (UR(15 + ((extras_cnt + a_extras_cnt) ? 2 : 0))) { 
 
        case 0: 
 
          /* Flip a single bit somewhere. Spooky! */ 
 
          FLIP_BIT(out_buf, UR(temp_len << 3)); 
          break; 
 
        case 1:  
 
          /* Set byte to interesting value. */ 
 
          out_buf[UR(temp_len)] = 
interesting_8[UR(sizeof(interesting_8))]; 
          break; 
 
        case 2: 
 
          /* Set word to interesting value, randomly choosing endian. */ 
 
          if (temp_len < 2) break; 
 
          if (UR(2)) { 
 
            *(u16*)(out_buf + UR(temp_len - 1)) = 
              interesting_16[UR(sizeof(interesting_16) >> 1)]; 
 
          } else { 
 
            *(u16*)(out_buf + UR(temp_len - 1)) = SWAP16( 
              interesting_16[UR(sizeof(interesting_16) >> 1)]); 
 
          } 
 
          break; 
 
        case 3: 
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          /* Set dword to interesting value, randomly choosing endian. */ 
 
          if (temp_len < 4) break; 
 
          if (UR(2)) { 
   
            *(u32*)(out_buf + UR(temp_len - 3)) = 
              interesting_32[UR(sizeof(interesting_32) >> 2)]; 
 
          } else { 
 
            *(u32*)(out_buf + UR(temp_len - 3)) = SWAP32( 
              interesting_32[UR(sizeof(interesting_32) >> 2)]); 
 
          } 
 
          break; 
 
        case 4: 
 
          /* Randomly subtract from byte. */ 
 
          out_buf[UR(temp_len)] -= 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
          break; 
 
        case 5: 
 
          /* Randomly add to byte. */ 
 
          out_buf[UR(temp_len)] += 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
          break; 
 
        case 6: 
 
          /* Randomly subtract from word, random endian. */ 
 
          if (temp_len < 2) break; 
 
          if (UR(2)) { 
 
            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 1); 
 
            *(u16*)(out_buf + pos) -= 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
          } else { 
 
            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 1); 
            u16 num = 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
            *(u16*)(out_buf + pos) = 
              SWAP16(SWAP16(*(u16*)(out_buf + pos)) - num); 
 
          } 
 
          break; 
 
        case 7: 
 
          /* Randomly add to word, random endian. */ 
 
          if (temp_len < 2) break; 
 
          if (UR(2)) { 
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            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 1); 
 
            *(u16*)(out_buf + pos) += 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
          } else { 
 
            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 1); 
            u16 num = 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
            *(u16*)(out_buf + pos) = 
              SWAP16(SWAP16(*(u16*)(out_buf + pos)) + num); 
 
          } 
 
          break; 
 
        case 8: 
 
          /* Randomly subtract from dword, random endian. */ 
 
          if (temp_len < 4) break; 
 
          if (UR(2)) { 
 
            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 3); 
 
            *(u32*)(out_buf + pos) -= 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
          } else { 
 
            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 3); 
            u32 num = 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
            *(u32*)(out_buf + pos) = 
              SWAP32(SWAP32(*(u32*)(out_buf + pos)) - num); 
 
          } 
 
          break; 
 
        case 9: 
 
          /* Randomly add to dword, random endian. */ 
 
          if (temp_len < 4) break; 
 
          if (UR(2)) { 
 
            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 3); 
 
            *(u32*)(out_buf + pos) += 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
          } else { 
 
            u32 pos = UR(temp_len - 3); 
            u32 num = 1 + UR(ARITH_MAX); 
 
            *(u32*)(out_buf + pos) = 
              SWAP32(SWAP32(*(u32*)(out_buf + pos)) + num); 
 
          } 
 
          break; 
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        case 10: 
 
          /* Just set a random byte to a random value. Because, 
             why not. We use XOR with 1-255 to eliminate the 
             possibility of a no-op. */ 
 
          out_buf[UR(temp_len)] ^= 1 + UR(255); 
          break; 
 
        case 11 ... 12: { 
 
            /* Delete bytes. We're making this a bit more likely 
               than insertion (the next option) in hopes of keeping 
               files reasonably small. */ 
 
            u32 del_from, del_len; 
 
            if (temp_len < 2) break; 
 
            /* Don't delete too much. */ 
 
            del_len = choose_block_len(temp_len - 1); 
 
            del_from = UR(temp_len - del_len + 1); 
 
            memmove(out_buf + del_from, out_buf + del_from + del_len, 
                    temp_len - del_from - del_len); 
 
            temp_len -= del_len; 
 
            break; 
 
          } 
 
        case 13: 
 
          if (temp_len + HAVOC_BLK_XL < MAX_FILE) { 
 
            /* Clone bytes (75%) or insert a block of constant bytes 
(25%). */ 
 
            u8  actually_clone = UR(4); 
            u32 clone_from, clone_to, clone_len; 
            u8* new_buf; 
 
            if (actually_clone) { 
 
              clone_len  = choose_block_len(temp_len); 
              clone_from = UR(temp_len - clone_len + 1); 
 
            } else { 
 
              clone_len = choose_block_len(HAVOC_BLK_XL); 
              clone_from = 0; 
 
            } 
 
            clone_to   = UR(temp_len); 
 
            new_buf = ck_alloc_nozero(temp_len + clone_len); 
 
            /* Head */ 
 
            memcpy(new_buf, out_buf, clone_to); 
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            /* Inserted part */ 
 
            if (actually_clone) 
              memcpy(new_buf + clone_to, out_buf + clone_from, 
clone_len); 
            else 
              memset(new_buf + clone_to, 
                     UR(2) ? UR(256) : out_buf[UR(temp_len)], clone_len); 
 
            /* Tail */ 
            memcpy(new_buf + clone_to + clone_len, out_buf + clone_to, 
                   temp_len - clone_to); 
 
            ck_free(out_buf); 
            out_buf = new_buf; 
            temp_len += clone_len; 
 
          } 
 
          break; 
 
        case 14: { 
 
            /* Overwrite bytes with a randomly selected chunk (75%) or 
fixed 
               bytes (25%). */ 
 
            u32 copy_from, copy_to, copy_len; 
 
            if (temp_len < 2) break; 
 
            copy_len  = choose_block_len(temp_len - 1); 
 
            copy_from = UR(temp_len - copy_len + 1); 
            copy_to   = UR(temp_len - copy_len + 1); 
 
            if (UR(4)) { 
 
              if (copy_from != copy_to) 
                memmove(out_buf + copy_to, out_buf + copy_from, 
copy_len); 
 
            } else memset(out_buf + copy_to, 
                          UR(2) ? UR(256) : out_buf[UR(temp_len)], 
copy_len); 
 
            break; 
 
          } 
 
        /* Values 15 and 16 can be selected only if there are any extras 
           present in the dictionaries. */ 
 
        case 15: { 
 
            /* Overwrite bytes with an extra. */ 
 
            if (!extras_cnt || (a_extras_cnt && UR(2))) { 
 
              /* No user-specified extras or odds in our favor. Let's use 
an 
                 auto-detected one. */ 
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              u32 use_extra = UR(a_extras_cnt); 
              u32 extra_len = a_extras[use_extra].len; 
              u32 insert_at; 
 
              if (extra_len > temp_len) break; 
 
              insert_at = UR(temp_len - extra_len + 1); 
              memcpy(out_buf + insert_at, a_extras[use_extra].data, 
extra_len); 
 
            } else { 
 
              /* No auto extras or odds in our favor. Use the dictionary. 
*/ 
 
              u32 use_extra = UR(extras_cnt); 
              u32 extra_len = extras[use_extra].len; 
              u32 insert_at; 
 
              if (extra_len > temp_len) break; 
 
              insert_at = UR(temp_len - extra_len + 1); 
              memcpy(out_buf + insert_at, extras[use_extra].data, 
extra_len); 
 
            } 
 
            break; 
 
          } 
 
        case 16: { 
 
            u32 use_extra, extra_len, insert_at = UR(temp_len + 1); 
            u8* new_buf; 
 
            /* Insert an extra. Do the same dice-rolling stuff as for the 
               previous case. */ 
 
            if (!extras_cnt || (a_extras_cnt && UR(2))) { 
 
              use_extra = UR(a_extras_cnt); 
              extra_len = a_extras[use_extra].len; 
 
              if (temp_len + extra_len >= MAX_FILE) break; 
 
              new_buf = ck_alloc_nozero(temp_len + extra_len); 
 
              /* Head */ 
              memcpy(new_buf, out_buf, insert_at); 
 
              /* Inserted part */ 
              memcpy(new_buf + insert_at, a_extras[use_extra].data, 
extra_len); 
 
            } else { 
 
              use_extra = UR(extras_cnt); 
              extra_len = extras[use_extra].len; 
 
              if (temp_len + extra_len >= MAX_FILE) break; 
 
              new_buf = ck_alloc_nozero(temp_len + extra_len); 
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              /* Head */ 
              memcpy(new_buf, out_buf, insert_at); 
 
              /* Inserted part */ 
              memcpy(new_buf + insert_at, extras[use_extra].data, 
extra_len); 
 
            } 
 
            /* Tail */ 
            memcpy(new_buf + insert_at + extra_len, out_buf + insert_at, 
                   temp_len - insert_at); 
 
            ck_free(out_buf); 
            out_buf   = new_buf; 
            temp_len += extra_len; 
 
            break; 
 
          } 
 
      } 
 
    } 
 
    if (common_fuzz_stuff(argv, out_buf, temp_len)) 
      goto abandon_entry; 
 
    /* out_buf might have been mangled a bit, so let's restore it to its 
       original size and shape. */ 
 
    if (temp_len < len) out_buf = ck_realloc(out_buf, len); 
    temp_len = len; 
    memcpy(out_buf, in_buf, len); 
 
    /* If we're finding new stuff, let's run for a bit longer, limits 
       permitting. */ 
 
    if (queued_paths != havoc_queued) { 
 
      if (perf_score <= HAVOC_MAX_MULT * 100) { 
        stage_max  *= 2; 
        perf_score *= 2; 
      } 
 
      havoc_queued = queued_paths; 
 
    } 
 
  } 
 
 
 
